Putin’s war on Ukraine would be a disaster for Russians
A war with Ukraine would do Russia no good no matter how it goes. Neither Ukraine itself nor its NATO membership pose a threat to Russia. A stable and effective democracy in Ukraine threatens the Russian regime, but that is another matter altogether. A war would bring huge human losses to Russia, a sharp deterioration of its economic situation, an exacerbation of all social problems, total isolation and the transformation of the country into a military encampment.
Tragically, none of this means that a war cannot take place, for reasons related to the psychology of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his cronies. But don’t make the mistake of thinking that the Russian people themselves want this war – or that they wouldn’t be victims as well.
The Russian government and Putin personally have been unable to accept the reality: the existence of an independent Ukraine. They see Ukraine as breakaway territory that must be returned to Russia or at the very least be an effective vassal state. This is why Putin keeps repeating the lies that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, that the Russian and Ukrainian languages are one language, and that Ukraine did not exist before Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin creates it.
A war with Ukraine would do Russia no good no matter how it goes. Neither Ukraine itself nor its NATO membership pose a threat to Russia. A stable and effective democracy in Ukraine threatens the Russian regime, but that is another matter altogether. A war would bring huge human losses to Russia, a sharp deterioration of its economic situation, an exacerbation of all social problems, total isolation and the transformation of the country into a military encampment.
Tragically, none of this means that a war cannot take place, for reasons related to the psychology of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his cronies. But don’t make the mistake of thinking that the Russian people themselves want this war – or that they wouldn’t be victims as well.
The Russian government and Putin personally have been unable to accept the reality: the existence of an independent Ukraine. They see Ukraine as breakaway territory that must be returned to Russia or at the very least be an effective vassal state. This is why Putin keeps repeating the lies that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, that the Russian and Ukrainian languages are one language, and that Ukraine did not exist before Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin creates it.
The war seems senseless for Russia, but it could break out because the goal of the Russian authorities is not to ensure the security and prosperity of their country but, above all, to achieve greatness as they perceive it. . For Putin and his entourage, greatness means that others fear you and that you can do whatever you want, regardless of laws and agreements. This is the policy they have pursued at home and the one they are also determined to impose on the world. Putin wants to be considered the master of half the world, like Joseph Stalin in 1945 or Genghis Khan. He wants to be the architect and founder of a new anti-Western world order.
Not understanding Putin’s true goals makes negotiations with him difficult. The demands he formulates, which his interlocutors often take seriously, do not matter to him that much; they are only a cover for what remains beyond the framework of the documents – his quest for recognition, admiration and respect. This is what motivates him to amass troops, not the implementation of the Minsk agreements.
Putin and his colleagues do not respect the West; they despise him, consider him cowardly and deceitful. That’s why they issued such a fundamentally impossible ultimatum and used such hostile language: they think the West should fear them, like a law-abiding citizen might fear a thug. However, their ultimatum did not have the desired effect. We have not seen a reiteration of the Munich agreement of 1938, when the UK and France ceded the Sudetenland to Germany. The situation is more like 1939, when Britain and France told Adolf Hitler that if he attacked Poland, they would declare war.
Two factors could prevent the Russian government from making a disastrous decision. The first would be Western sanctions, but not sectoral sanctions, which affect the standard of living of ordinary Russians, which the Kremlin does not care about unless it causes more political discontent. What might be effective would be personal sanctions aimed at those closest to Putin. Most of them have assets and real estate in the West, and their relatives live or stay for long periods in the United States and Europe. Their dissatisfaction could affect decisions made by Putin as well as the regime as a whole.
The second sobering consideration would be to understand that the Ukrainian military will fight. Putin’s electorate will not forgive him if their sons and daughters start coming home in body bags. And the technical preparation and morale of the Ukrainians are not as important as their perception in Moscow. The common stereotypes in Russia – that Ukrainians are cowards and give in to the use of force, while Russians are the strongest – could play a negative role here. In December 1994, as Defense Minister Pavel Grachev persuaded President Boris Yeltsin to start a war in Chechnya, he promised to capture Grozny in two hours with a division. Instead, the Chechen wars lasted for many years, costing tens of thousands of lives and left Russia with tenuous control of territory at best. And before the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia, the generals assured Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that the Afghan fighters would undoubtedly lose to the Russian army, the best soldiers in the world.
But even if the deterrents are effective, Putin will need a way to save face. He will have to declare his victory, whatever that victory is. Prestige is more important to Putin than anything else. If he does not find a solution, Putin can opt for war, however senseless and destructive it may be.
Putin’s influence on the West is reinforced by another misperception: many people in the United States and Europe have an erroneous view of Russian society. In particular, many overestimate the level of popular support for Putin. His election results certainly do not reflect real sentiment. Support for Putin and his United Russia party has steadily declined, as evidenced by public opinion polls and focus group discussions.
Moreover, even Putin’s supporters among the public do so for largely negative reasons – the belief that others are even worse and that Putin’s departure would mean a breakdown of social order. Hardly anyone thinks Putin can make the country better; there is no positive support. People don’t think Putin can “make Russia great again.”
The idea of a war with Ukraine is also very unpopular. The patriotic fervor that swept across Russia with the annexation of Crimea is long gone. Yes, the propaganda worked. Most Russians believe that the United States and Ukraine are inciting war, and only 4% understand that Russia would be at fault if war broke out; however, the majority want and hope to avoid war. If a war starts, there will be no public consensus.
Looking at Russian history, many in the West believe that a dictatorship is natural for the country and that Russians don’t need freedom. But Russian history is not just a series of dictators like Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. There were also rulers like Alexander II, who emancipated the serfs of Russia without war; Alexander Kerensky, the head of the post-revolutionary government; Mikhail Gorbachev; and Yeltsin. There were the Novgorod and Pskov republics.
And today, Russia has European cities and pro-European young people, as well as fearless citizens who go to prison in the name of freedom – their own and that of others – and in the name of the right to speak the truth. Catherine the Great once proclaimed that “Russia is a European power”. Russians yearn for freedom and deserve it no less than Americans and Europeans.